

Message Text

SECRET

PAGE 01 STATE 188052
ORIGIN SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 /026 R

DRAFTED BY AF/E:GSCOTT:AB
APPROVED BY AF:TSEELYE
AF/E:JWHITING
S/S-O:TGMARTIN

-----061340 100134Z /73

O P 092220Z AUG 77
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY MOGADISCIO IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY BONN PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY ROME PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY NAIROBI PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY
INFO AMEMBASSY PARIS PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY CAIRO PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY JIDDA PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY SANA PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY TEHRAN PRIORITY

S E C R E T STATE 188052

EXDIS

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: SO, US, MASS

SUBJECT MEETING OF THE SOMALIA ARMS DELEGATION WITH
DEPT OFFICIALS, AUGUST 8, 1977

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 02 STATE 188052

SUMMARY: SOMALI ARMS DELEGATION MET WITH DEPARTMENT OFFICIALS
AUGUST 8 TO REQUEST IMMEDIATE US SUPPLY OF AT LEAST SOME OF
THE ARMS PREVIOUSLY REQUESTED. DEPARTMENT OFFICIALS
REPLIED THAT LEGAL AND BUREAUCRATIC

REQUIREMENTS WOULD DELAY THE BEGINNING OF ANY ARMS RELATION-

SHIPIN ADDITION, THE ESCALATED FIGHTING IN THE OGADEN HAD CHANGED THE CONTEXT IN WHICH THE ORIGINAL DECISION HAD BEEN MADE. THEREFORE, UNTIL STABILITY HAD BEEN RETURNED TO THE OGADEN WE WOULD BE UNABLE TO IMPLEMENT THE PRESIDENT'S DECISION. OFFICIALS ALSO NOTED OUR SUPPORT FOR THE PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT OF THE DISPUTE AND THE OAU MEDIATION EFFORT. END SUMMARY.

1. SOMALI AMBASSADOR ADDOU AND THE SOMALI ARMS DELEGATION CONSISTING OF AMBASSADOR ABDURAHMAN HUSSEIN AND LT. COL. MOHAMED ADEN ADDELLE, MET WITH ACYINY ASSISTANT SECRETARY TALCOTT SEELYE AND DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF POLITICAL-MILITARY AFFAIRS RICHARD ERICSON ON AUGUST 8. ADDOU AND HUSSEIN BEGAN BY NOTING THAT THE SOMALI GOVERNMENT HAD ALWAYS

DESIRED GOOD RELATIONS WITH THE UNITED STATES AND HAD FIRST APPROACHED US AT INDEPENDENCE 15 YEARS AGO. WE NOW HAD A SECOND OPPORTUNITY TO BEGIN A FRUITFUL RELATIONSHIP.

2. AMBASSADOR SEELYE REPLIED THAT THE UNITED STATES WAS ALSO HAPPY THAT RELATIONS WERE IMPROVING. WE HAD NOTED THE COMMON DESIRE DURING THE LAST THREE MONTHS TO DEVELOP A DIALOGUE AND WE WERE PREPARED TO GO EVEN FURTHER TO PROVIDE ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE AND DEFENSIVE EQUIPMENT FOR THE SOMALI ARMED FORCES AS PART OF A MULTINATIONAL EFFORT IN WHICH WE WOULD PLAY ONE ROLE. SEELYE CAUTIONED THAT OUR
SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 03 STATE 188052

DECISION WAS NOT MADE WITH THE INTENTION OF DAMAGING OUR RELATIONS WITH KENYA, DJIBOUTI OR ETHIOPIA; WE WOULD CONDUCT OURSELVES IN SUCH A WAY AS NOT TO IMPAIR RELATIONS WITH KENYA OR DJIBOUTI, NOR WOULD WE WISH TO DO ANYTHING TO DAMAGE THE PROSPECT OF BETTER FUTURE RELATIONS WITH ETHIOPIA. NOR WAS OUR DECISION TAKEN WITH ANY INTENT TO WEAKEN OUR SUPPORT FOR THE OAU PRINCIPLE FOR THE TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY OF AFRICAN STATES. SEELYE NOTED THAT WE WERE AWARE OF SOMALIA'S GROWING ARMS SUPPLY RELATIONSHIP WITH MANY OF OUR FRIENDS AND ALLIES. WE HAD ENCOURAGED THIS RELATIONSHIP AND WE WOULD DO NOTHING TO DISCOURAGE IT NOW.

3. SEELYE SAID THE CONTEXT OF THE US DECISION TO ASSIST IN SUPPLYING MILITARY EQUIPMENT HAD BEEN SIGNIFICANTLY CHANGED BY THE ESCALATION OF THE FIGHTING IN THE OGADEN AND THE CAPTURE OF ALMOST ALL THE DISPUTED TERRITORY BY FORCES OF THE WESTERN SOMALI LIBERATION FRONT ASSISTED BY THE PRESENCE OF REGULAR SOMALI UNITS IN THE OGADEN. OUR SITUATION WAS THEREFORE VERY DIFFICULT. DESPITE ANY SOMALI ASSURANCES THAT ANY MILITARY EQUIPMENT WE MIGHT SELL THEM WOULD BE USED IN SOMALIA PROPER, IF WE WERE TO SHIP ARMS NOW THE IMPRESSION WOULD BE CREATPD THAT WE WERE ABETTINY

ONE AFRICAN STATE AGGRESS ANOTHER. THEREFORE, UNTIL STABILITY HAD BEEN RESTORED TO THE OGADEN, WE WOULD HAVE DIFFICULTY IN IMPLEMENTING THE PRESIDENT'S DECISION AND IN CONVINCING THE CONGRESS, THE PUBLIC AND MANY IN THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH OF THE WISDOM OF OUR MOVE. WE WISHED TO EMPHASIZE THAT WE SUPPORTED THE PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT OF THE DISPUTE AND THE OAU MEDIATION EFFORT.

4. SEELYE EMPHASIZED THAT IN IMPLEMENTING AN ARMS SUPPLY RELATIONSHIP OVER THE LONGER TERM, IT WAS IMPORTANT TO IDENTIFY GAPS IN SOMALIA'S DEFENSIVE STRUCTURE WHICH WE MIGHT BE ABLE TO FILL RATHER THAN WORK WITH THE LIST OF MILITARY ITEMS WHICH THE SOMALIS HAD REQUESTED WHICH CONSISTED ALMOST ENTIRELY OF ARMS WHICH COULD BE USED IN THE
SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 04 STATE 188052

OGADEN. FURTHER, ARMS TRANSFERS REQUIRE TIME, MEASURED IN MONTHS RATHER THAN WEEKS, TO MEET OUR VARIOUS LEGAL AND

BUREAUCRATIC REQUIREMENTS. HOWEVER, SUCH UNAVOIDABLE DELAYS WERE NOT NECESSARILY INCOMPATIBLE WITH SOMALIA'S ATTEMPT TO SEEK ALTERNATE SOURCES OF EQUIPMENT IN AN ORDERLY GRADUAL PROCESS OF DISENGAGEMENT FROM COMPLETE RELIANCE ON THE SOVIET UNION. IN THIS RESPECT, OUR PUBLIC POLITICAL COMMITMENT WAS ALREADY AN IMPORTANT MOVE IN ASSISTING SOMALIA.

5. IN REPLY AMBASSADORS HUSSEIN AND ADDOU SAID THAT WE OUGHT NOT TO TIE OUR RELATIONSHIP SO CLOSELY TO THE OGADEN STRUGGLE WHICH WAS OF LONG-STANDING. THE POPULATION OF THAT AREA HAD LONG WANTED TO THROW OFF ETHIOPIAN RULE; THEY HAD SEIZED THIS PARTICULAR MOMENT AND COULD NOT BE HELD BACK. PRESIDENT SIAD COULD NOT STOP THE FIGHTING IF HE WISHED TO. SOMALIA FELT A FUNDAMENTAL MORAL OBLIGATION TO HELP ITS BROTHERS IN THE FIELD. THE SOMALIS ACKNOWLEDGED HAVING SUPPLIED SOME ARMS TO THE FIGHTERS AND THE PRESENCE OF SOMALI VETERANS IN THE IRREGULAR RANKS, BUT THEY DID NOT ADMIT THE PRESENCE OF REGULAR SOMALI UNITS IN THE OGADEN. IN ANY CASE NO ARMS FROM THE UNITED STATES OR ITS ALLIES WOULD REACH THE AREA IN TIME TO BE USED BEFORE THE OGADEN FIGHTING WAS OVER. NOW SOMALIA FEARED AN INVASION FROM ETHIOPIA SUPPORTED BY THE SOVIET UNION AND BY THOUSANDS OF CUBANS, A DANGER HEIGHTENED BY THE US ANNOUNCEMENT OF ITS DECISION TO SUPPLY ARMS TO SOMALIA. SINCE THAT TIME THE ETHIOPIANS HAD BEEN ABLE TO CALL ON FULL SOVIET SUPPORT AND WERE RECEIVING AN UNSTINTING SUPPLY; MEANWHILE THE SOVIETS WERE CUTTING BACK SHARPLY ON THEIR DELIVERIES TO SOMALIA. THERE WAS A REAL THREAT TO THE EXISTENCE OF THE TERRITORY OF THE SOMALI STATE. IF THE UNITED STATES COULD
SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 05 STATE 188052

NOT SUPPLY ARMS DIRECTLY IMMEDIATELY, AT LEAST WE COULD PERMIT THE IRANIANS AND THE SAUDIS TO DO SO.

6. IN REPLY MR. ERICSON EMPHASIZED THAT MOST OF THE RESTRAINTS WHICH APPLIED TO DIRECT WEAPON TRANSFERS ALSO APPLIED TO THIRD-COUNTRY TRANSFERS AND THAT SWIFT ACTION IN EITHER CASE WAS NOT LEGALLY OR BUREAUCRATICALLY POSSIBLE. AMBASSADOR SEELYE POINTED OUT THAT WE BELIEVED THE NUMBER OF CUBAN MILITARY PEOPLE IN ETHIOPIA PROBABLY DID NOT EXCEED 60 OR 70; HUSSEIN THEN SAID THAT THE 3,000 CUBANS HE HAD MENTIONED WERE THOSE EXPECTED SHORTLY TO ARRIVE.

7. EMPHASIZING AGAIN THE PLIGHT OF SOMALIA, ADDOU SAID IT WAS VITAL THAT SOME MILITARY SUPPLIES BE SENT, WHETHER DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY. A US COMMITMENT BY ITSELF WOULD NOT DEFEND THE COUNTRY. MEANWHILE WHAT WOULD HAPPEN IF

SOMALIA CONQUERED DIRE DAWA AND HARRAR AND THE SOVIET UNION THEN MEDIATED THE DISPUTE? IN SUCH A SITUATION THE UNITED STATES WOULD BE OUT OF THE GAME AND OUR CHANCE FOR INCREASED INFLUENCE IN THE AREA WOULD HAVE BEEN LOST.

8. AMBASSADOR SEELYE REPLIED THAT THE AMERICAN PUBLIC COMMITMENT WAS IN ITSELF USEFUL TO SOMALIA BECAUSE IT PROVIDED NEEDED POLITICAL SUPPORT AMBASSADOR SEELYE RE--ITERATED THAT A GREAT DEAL OF TIME -AS ALWAYS REQUIRED I

ESTABLISHING AN ARMS SUPPLY RELATIONSHIP AND THAT CONTRARY TO SOMALI REPORTS, THE ETHIOPIANS TOO WERE DISTURBED BY WHAT THEY BELIEVED TO BE THE SLOW PACE OF RUSSIAN SHIPMENTS TO THE ADDIS REGIME. HE CLOSED BY ENCOURAGING THE SOMALI DELEGATION TO EXPLAIN ITS DEFENSIVE NEEDS TO THE PEOPLE THEY WOULD BE MEETING AT THE PENTAGON TOMORROW, TUESDAY, AUGUST 9. CHRISTOPHER

SECRET

NNN

SECRET

PAGE 01 STATE 188052

ORIGIN SS-15

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 /016 R

66011

DRAFTED BY: EUR/EE:DNJOHNSON:DJW

APPROVED BY: EUR/EE/NGANDREWS

AF/E:MR SCOTT

S/S:RLHART

-----025954 140209Z /70

R 130640Z AUG 77

FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO AMEMBASSY BELGRADE

S E C R E T STATE 188052

EXDIS

FOLLOWING TEL SENT ACTION USDEL SECRETARY FROM STATE AUG 10:

QUOTE S E C R E T STATE 188052 TOSEC 080280

EXDIS

FOLLOWING REPEAT STATE 188052 ACTION MOGADISCIO ISLAMABAD

BONN ROME NAIROBI ADDIS ABABA MOSCOW USUN INFO PARIS

LONDON CAIRO JIDDA KHARTOUM SANA TEHRAN 09 AUG 77

QUOTE

S E C R E T STATE 188052

EXDIS

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: SO, US, MASS

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 02 STATE 188052

SUBJECT MEETING OF THE SOMALIA ARMS DELEGATION WITH

DEPT OFFICIALS, AUGUST 8, 1977

SUMMARY: SOMALI ARMS DELEGATION MET WITH DEPARTMENT OFFICIALS

AUGUST 8 TO REQUEST IMMEDIATE US SUPPLY OF AT LEAST SOME OF

THE ARMS PREVIOUSLY REQUESTED. DEPARTMENT OFFICIALS

REPLIED THAT LEGAL AND BUREAUCRATIC

REQUIREMENTS WOULD DELAY THE BEGINNING OF ANY ARMS RELATION-

SHIPIN ADDITION, THE ESCALATED

FIGHTING IN THE OGADEN HAD CHANGED THE CONTEXT IN WHICH THE

ORIGINAL DECISION HAD BEEN MADE. THEREFORE, UNTIL

STABILITY HAD BEEN RETURNED TO THE OGADEN WE WOULD BE UNABLE

TO IMPLEMENT THE PRESIDENT'S DECISION. OFFICIALS ALSO

NOTED OUR SUPPORT FOR THE PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT OF THE DISPUTE

AND THE OAU MEDIATION EFFORT. END SUMMARY.

1. SOMALI AMBASSADOR ADDOU AND THE SOMALI ARMS DELEGATION CONSISTING OF AMBASSADOR ABDURAHMAN HUSSEIN AND LT. COL. MOHAMED ADEN ADDELLE, MET WITH ACYINY ASSISTANT SECRETARY TALCOTT SEELYE AND DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF POLITICAL-MILITARY AFFAIRS RICHARD ERICSON ON AUGUST 8. ADDOU AND HUSSEIN BEGAN BY NOTING THAT THE SOMALI GOVERNMENT HAD ALWAYS

DESIRED GOOD RELATIONS WITH THE UNITED STATES AND HAD FIRST APPROACHED US AT INDEPENDENCE 15 YEARS AGO. WE NOW HAD A SECOND OPPORTUNITY TO BEGIN A FRUITFUL RELATIONSHIP.

2. AMBASSADOR SEELYE REPLIED THAT THE UNITED STATES WAS ALSO HAPPY THAT RELATIONS WERE IMPROVING. WE HAD NOTED THE COMMON DESIRE DURING THE LAST THREE MONTHS TO DEVELOP A DIALOGUE AND WE WERE PREPARED TO GO EVEN FURTHER TO PROVIDE ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE AND DEFENSIVE EQUIPMENT FOR THE
SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 03 STATE 188052

SOMALI ARMED FORCES AS PART OF A MULTINATIONAL EFFORT IN WHICH WE WOULD PLAY ONE ROLE. SEELYE CAUTIONED THAT OUR DECISION WAS NOT MADE WITH THE INTENTION OF DAMAGING OUR RELATIONS WITH KENYA, DJIBOUTI OR ETHIOPIA; WE WOULD CONDUCT OURSELVES IN SUCH A WAY AS NOT TO IMPAIR RELATIONS WITH KENYA OR DJIBOUTI, NOR WOULD WE WISH TO DO ANYTHING TO DAMAGE THE PROSPECT OF BETTER FUTURE RELATIONS WITH ETHIOPIA. NOR WAS OUR DECISION TAKEN WITH ANY INTENT TO WEAKEN OUR SUPPORT FOR THE OAU PRINCIPLE FOR THE TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY OF AFRICAN STATES. SEELYE NOTED THAT WE WERE AWARE OF SOMALIA'S GROWING ARMS SUPPLY RELATIONSHIP WITH MANY OF OUR FRIENDS AND ALLIES. WE HAD ENCOURAGED THIS RELATIONSHIP AND WE WOULD DO NOTHING TO DISCOURAGE IT NOW.

3. SEELYE SAID THE CONTEXT OF THE US DECISION TO ASSIST IN SUPPLYING MILITARY EQUIPMENT HAD BEEN SIGNIFICANTLY CHANGED BY THE ESCALATION OF THE FIGHTING IN THE OGADEN AND THE CAPTURE OF ALMOST ALL THE DISPUTED TERRITORY BY FORCES OF THE WESTERN SOMALI LIBERATION FRONT ASSISTED BY THE PRESENCE OF REGULAR SOMALI UNITS IN THE OGADEN. OUR SITUATION WAS THEREFORE VERY DIFFICULT. DESPITE ANY SOMALI ASSURANCES THAT ANY MILITARY EQUIPMENT WE MIGHT SELL THEM WOULD BE USED IN SOMALIA PROPER, IF WE WERE TO SHIP ARMS NOW THE IMPRESSION WOULD BE CREATED THAT WE WERE ABETTINY ONE AFRICAN STATE AGGRESS ANOTHER. THEREFORE, UNTIL STABILITY HAD BEEN RESTORED TO THE OGADEN, WE WOULD HAVE DIFFICULTY IN IMPLEMENTING THE PRESIDENT'S DECISION AND IN CONVINCING THE CONGRESS, THE PUBLIC AND MANY IN THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH OF THE WISDOM OF OUR MOVE. WE WISHED TO EMPHASIZE THAT WE SUPPORTED THE PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT OF THE

DISPUTE AND THE OAU MEDIATION EFFORT.

4. SEELYE EMPHASIZED THAT IN IMPLEMENTING AN ARMS SUPPLY RELATIONSHIP OVER THE LONGER TERM, IT WAS IMPORTANT TO IDENTIFY GAPS IN SOMALIA'S DEFENSIVE STRUCTURE WHICH WE MIGHT BE ABLE TO FILL RATHER THAN WORK WITH THE LIST OF
SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 04 STATE 188052

MILITARY ITEMS WHICH THE SOMALIS HAD REQUESTED WHICH CONSISTED ALMOST ENTIRELY OF ARMS WHICH COULD BE USED IN THE OGADEN. FURTHER, ARMS TRANSFERS REQUIRE TIME, MEASURED IN MONTHS RATHER THAN WEEKS, TO MEET OUR VARIOUS LEGAL AND

BUREAUCRATIC REQUIREMENTS. HOWEVER, SUCH UNAVOIDABLE DELAYS WERE NOT NECESSARILY INCOMPATIBLE WITH SOMALIA'S ATTEMPT TO SEEK ALTERNATE SOURCES OF EQUIPMENT IN AN ORDERLY GRADUAL PROCESS OF DISENGAGEMENT FROM COMPLETE RELIANCE ON THE SOVIET UNION. IN THIS RESPECT, OUR PUBLIC POLITICAL COMMITMENT WAS ALREADY AN IMPORTANT MOVE IN ASSISTING SOMALIA.

5. IN REPLY AMBASSADORS HUSSEIN AND ADDOU SAID THAT WE OUGHT NOT TO TIE OUR RELATIONSHIP SO CLOSELY TO THE OGADEN STRUGGLE WHICH WAS OF LONG-STANDING. THE POPULATION OF THAT AREA HAD LONG WANTED TO THROW OFF ETHIOPIAN RULE; THEY HAD SEIZED THIS PARTICULAR MOMENT AND COULD NOT BE HELD BACK. PRESIDENT SIAD COULD NOT STOP THE FIGHTING IF HE WISHED TO. SOMALIA FELT A FUNDAMENTAL MORAL OBLIGATION TO HELP ITS BROTHERS IN THE FIELD. THE SOMALIS ACKNOWLEDGED HAVING SUPPLIED SOME ARMS TO THE FIGHTERS AND THE PRESENCE OF SOMALI VETERANS IN THE IRREGULAR RANKS, BUT THEY DID NOT ADMIT THE PRESENCE OF REGULAR SOMALI UNITS IN THE OGADEN. IN ANY CASE NO ARMS FROM THE UNITED STATES OR ITS ALLIES WOULD REACH THE AREA IN TIME TO BE USED BEFORE THE OGADEN FIGHTING WAS OVER. NOW SOMALIA FEARED AN INVASION FROM ETHIOPIA SUPPORTED BY THE SOVIET UNION AND BY THOUSANDS OF CUBANS, A DANGER HEIGHTENED BY THE US ANNOUNCEMENT OF ITS DECISION TO SUPPLY ARMS TO SOMALIA. SINCE THAT TIME THE ETHIOPIANS HAD BEEN ABLE TO CALL ON FULL SOVIET SUPPORT AND WERE RECEIVING AN UNSTINTING SUPPLY; MEANWHILE THE SOVIETS WERE CUTTING BACK SHARPLY ON THEIR DELIVERIES TO
SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 05 STATE 188052

SOMALIA. THERE WAS A REAL THREAT TO THE EXISTENCE OF THE TERRITORY OF THE SOMALI STATE. IF THE UNITED STATES COULD NOT SUPPLY ARMS DIRECTLY IMMEDIATELY, AT LEAST WE COULD

PERMIT THE IRANIANS AND THE SAUDIS TO DO SO.

6. IN REPLY MR. ERICSON EMPHASIZED THAT MOST OF THE RESTRAINTS WHICH APPLIED TO DIRECT WEAPON TRANSFERS ALSO APPLIED TO THIRD-COUNTRY TRANSFERS AND THAT SWIFT ACTION IN EITHER CASE WAS NOT LEGALLY OR BUREAUCRATICALLY POSSIBLE. AMBASSADOR SEELYE POINTED OUT THAT WE BELIEVED THE NUMBER OF CUBAN MILITARY PEOPLE IN ETHIOPIA PROBABLY DID NOT EXCEED 60 OR 70; HUSSEIN THEN SAID THAT THE 3,000 CUBANS HE HAD MENTIONED WERE THOSE EXPECTED SHORTLY TO ARRIVE.

7. EMPHASIZING AGAIN THE PLIGHT OF SOMALIA, ADDOU SAID IT WAS VITAL THAT SOME MILITARY SUPPLIES BE SENT, WHETHER DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY. A US COMMITMENT BY ITSELF WOULD NOT DEFEND THE COUNTRY. MEANWHILE WHAT WOULD HAPPEN IF

SOMALIA CONQUERED DIRE DAWA AND HARRAR AND THE SOVIET UNION THEN MEDIATED THE DISPUTE? IN SUCH A SITUATION THE UNITED STATES WOULD BE OUT OF THE GAME AND OUR CHANCE FOR INCREASED INFLUENCE IN THE AREA WOULD HAVE BEEN LOST.

8. AMBASSADOR SEELYE REPLIED THAT THE AMERICAN PUBLIC COMMITMENT WAS IN ITSELF USEFUL TO SOMALIA BECAUSE IT PROVIDED NEEDED POLITICAL SUPPORT AMBASSADOR SEELYE RE-ITERATED THAT A GREAT DEAL OF TIME AS ALWAYS REQUIRED IN ESTABLISHING AN ARMS SUPPLY RELATIONSHIP AND THAT CONTRARY TO SOMALI REPORTS, THE ETHIOPIANS TOO WERE DISTURBED BY WHAT THEY BELIEVED TO BE THE SLOW PACE OF RUSSIAN SHIPMENTS TO THE ADDIS REGIME. HE CLOSED BY ENCOURAGING THE SOMALI DELEGATION TO EXPLAIN ITS DEFENSIVE NEEDS TO THE PEOPLE THEY WOULD BE MEETING AT THE PENTAGON TOMORROW, TUESDAY, AUGUST 9. CHRISTOPGER UNQTE CHRRISTOPHER UNQUOTE CHRISTOPHER

SECRET

NNN

Message Attributes

Automatic Decaptioning: Z
Capture Date: 01-Jan-1994 12:00:00 am
Channel Indicators: n/a
Current Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Concepts: MILITARY PROCUREMENT, MILITARY VISITS, MEETINGS
Control Number: n/a
Copy: SINGLE
Sent Date: 09-Aug-1977 12:00:00 am
Decaption Date: 22 May 2009
Decaption Note: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Action: RELEASED
Disposition Approved on Date:
Disposition Case Number: n/a
Disposition Comment: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Date: 22 May 2009
Disposition Event:
Disposition History: n/a
Disposition Reason:
Disposition Remarks:
Document Number: 1977STATE188052
Document Source: CORE
Document Unique ID: 00
Drafter: GSCOTT:AB
Enclosure: n/a
Executive Order: GS
Errors: N/A
Expiration:
Film Number: D770287-0070
Format: TEL
From: STATE
Handling Restrictions:
Image Path:
ISecure: 1
Legacy Key: link1977/newtext/t19770879/aaaacpis.tel
Line Count: 417
Litigation Code IDs:
Litigation Codes:
Litigation History:
Locator: TEXT ON-LINE, ON MICROFILM
Message ID: 91c8bf5d-c288-dd11-92da-001cc4696bcc
Office: ORIGIN SS
Original Classification: SECRET
Original Handling Restrictions: EXDIS
Original Previous Classification: n/a
Original Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Page Count: 8
Previous Channel Indicators: n/a
Previous Classification: SECRET
Previous Handling Restrictions: EXDIS
Reference: n/a
Retention: 0
Review Action: RELEASED, APPROVED
Review Content Flags:
Review Date: 01-Feb-2005 12:00:00 am
Review Event:
Review Exemptions: n/a
Review Media Identifier:
Review Release Date: n/a
Review Release Event: n/a
Review Transfer Date:
Review Withdrawn Fields: n/a
SAS ID: 1654990
Secure: OPEN
Status: NATIVE
Subject: CT MEETING OF THE SOMALIA ARMS DELEGATION WITH DEPT OFFICIALS, AUGUST 8, 1977 SECRET
TAGS: MASS, SO, US
To: MOGADISCIO ISLAMABAD MULTIPLE
Type: TE
vdkgvwkey: odbc://SAS/SAS.dbo.SAS_Docs/91c8bf5d-c288-dd11-92da-001cc4696bcc
Review Markings:
Margaret P. Grafeld
Declassified/Released
US Department of State
EO Systematic Review
22 May 2009
Markings: Margaret P. Grafeld Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 22 May 2009